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Abstract
Previous theories of "nancial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the
credit or the equity market. An interesting question is whether credit and equity rationing
are mutually compatible, and how they interact. We consider a model with two-
dimensional asymmetric information, where entrepreneurs have private information
about both the expected returns and the risk of their projects. We show that credit and
equity rationing may occur individually or simultaneously. Moreover, competition
between the two markets may generate the adverse selection that leads to rationing
outcomes. ( 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classixcation: G1
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1. Introduction
In their 1981 paper, Stiglitz and Weiss showed that credit rationing could
occur when investors have less information than the entrepreneurs about the
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2The work of Leland and Pyle (1977), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and then Stiglitz and Weiss (1986)
also considered collateral requirements and showed that these may not always su$ce to eliminate
the rationing outcome.
risk of an investment. A literature developed on the basis of this simple model.
Cho (1986) noted that adverse selection would disappear in the 1981 model if
investors used equity instead of debt. Using a di!erent set of assumptions } the
most important di!erence being that expected returns and not risk was the
parameter of asymmetric information } Myers and Majluf (1984) and Green-
wald et al. (1984) showed that equity markets could have rationing too. This
raised the issue of whether theories of credit and equity rationing could be made
compatible. DeMeza and Webb (1987) integrated the various approaches and
showed the following result: If there is asymmetric information about expected
returns, then investors prefer debt over equity and there cannot be any credit
rationing. But if there is asymmetric information about risk, then investors
prefer equity over debt and there cannot be any equity rationing. At a "rst
glance, this result seems to solve the issue: as long as investors use the appropri-
ate "nancial instrument, there cannot be any rationing. The analysis of DeMeza
and Webb, however, did not allow for asymmetric information about both
expected returns and risk.
A number of other papers also questioned the rationing outcome. Bester
(1985a), Milde and Riley (1988) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) introduced
variable loan sizes to give investors a second instrument besides price to screen
loan applicants. Wette (1983) and Bester (1985b) allowed investors to extract
information from the entrepreneurs through the use of collateral requirements.2
The work of Leland and Pyle (1977), Stiglitz (1982) and Brennan and Kraus
(1987) similarly suggested that co-investment requirement and capital structure
could be used to screen applicants. This line of research showed how investors
can solve the rationing problem by o!ering more complicated "nancial con-
tracts. In the ensuing separating equilibrium investors o!er a menu of contracts
that induces self-selection among entrepreneurs in such a way that the equilib-
rium actually reveals the asymmetric information.
One issue with this approach is that the structure of optimal contracts is very
sensitive to the speci"c nature of asymmetric information and the particular
instruments available to investors. Contracts are chosen solely to induce self-
selection and the asymmetric information is su$ciently small so that the
optimal contracts can separate most or all types. In many real economic
situations the environment may be too complex for investors to separate out all
relevant information through the clever use of "nancial contracts.
Another limitation is that investors are all the same, all o!ering the same
optimal menu of contracts. In reality investors are often heterogeneous and they
specialize in particular forms of "nancing. Banks, for example, specialize in
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3 Interestingly, even in countries where banks are allowed to hold equity they typically take equity
only in rare circumstances and mostly in large public corporations.
credit instruments while private equity funds specialize in equity.3 Entrepre-
neurs seek out these various types of investors and they choose their funding
structure based on the o!ers investors make and based on their own preferences.
These observations lead us to believe that it may be interesting to model
credit and equity markets as an environment where there are heterogeneous
investors that are competing with each other to ,nance entrepreneurs that have
a large amount of private information. The question we pursue in this paper is
whether in such circumstances credit and equity markets always clear or
whether there can be rationing. One of the reasons why little research has been
done along those lines is that it is technically di$cult to model such an
environment. In this paper we hope to make a "rst step in this direction. In our
model investors specialize in one of two standard "nancial contracts, debt or
equity. There is asymmetric information about both the expected returns and
the risk of the entrepreneurs' projects. To make the model tractable we use two
strong simplifying assumptions. Investors can only set prices. And entrepreneurs
can accept funding from either the debt or the equity market, but not from both.
Our main result is that in such a model there may indeed be credit rationing,
equity rationing or even simultaneous credit and equity rationing. The most
surprising part is that rationing may actually be the result of competition between
these two sets of specialized investors.
We "rst establish that although investors specializing in debt attract better
entrepreneurs (i.e., higher expected returns) they also attract riskier entrepre-
neurs (i.e., higher variance). Increasing the price of debt has three e!ects on the
returns to debt. First, there is the usual positive price e!ect. Second, there is
a positive selection e!ect of losing some low-return high-risk entrepreneurs.
Third, there is an adverse selection e!ect of losing some high-return low-risk
entrepreneurs who switch to the equity market. If the adverse selection e!ect
dominates the two other e!ects, returns to debt decrease in their own price. Debt
investors may be unwilling to raise their prices in the presence of excess demand,
and rationing occurs. Similar reasoning applies to the equity market. As a conse-
quence, market equilibrium may feature credit rationing, equity rationing or
even both.
In the traditional model, adverse selection comes from the fact that, as prices
increase, some of the best entrepreneurs no longer want to invest. As prices
increase in this model, some of the best entrepreneurs switch to the other
market. If there are many entrepreneurs switching between the two markets,
investors may compete more "ercely by lowering their prices. Prices may fall
below their Walrasian levels and rationing ensues. We also show that if all
investors were to specialize in equity, the market would always clear. Together,
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4 In Hellmann and Stiglitz (1995) we also examine a more general speci"cation where k and
p represent general parameters of "rst-order and second-order stochastic dominance.
5The assumption of risk-neutrality is not essential to our arguments (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1987)
for a model with risk-aversion). Nothing substantial would change in the model with risk-aversion
as long as Lemma 1 holds. Bankruptcy costs have an e!ect similar to risk-aversion when borne by
the entrepreneurs. When borne by the investors, they may provide a separate rationale for credit
rationing, as shown by Williamson (1987).
6Note that k5K is a necessary condition for the participation constraint to be satis"ed.
these results show that the existence of heterogeneous specialized investors can
have an important impact on the equilibrium.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model.
Section 3 explains the self-selection process. Section 4 examines the investors'
return functions. Section 5 discusses the various rationing equilibria. It is
followed by a brief conclusion.
2. The basic model
We consider a model with a continuum of entrepreneurs and investors.
Entrepreneurs have an investment project that requires one unit of outside
capital. They have limited liability, no collateral and their opportunity cost of
working on the project is K. The project either fails and yields no returns, or it
succeeds and yields veri"able returns n. The probability of success is (1/p). We
write n"pk, so that the expected returns is (1/p)pk"k, and p measures risk.4
There is asymmetric information about both k and p. Investors do not know the
entrepreneurs' types, denoted by h,(k, p)3[0,R)][1,R), but only the joint
distribution N(h), with density n(h). There is no discounting, all parties are
risk-neutral and there are no bankruptcy costs.5
As discussed in the introduction, there are two distinct types of investor. The
"rst set of investors specializes in debt (or credit } we will use these two terms
interchangeably). A debt contract speci"es a "xed value of D (interest plus
principle) that an entrepreneur owes the investors. In case of success entrepre-
neurs receive max[0,n!D]. The second set of investors specializes in equity.
An equity contact speci"es the investor's percentage share E. In case of success
entrepreneurs receive (1!E)n.
Let ; and < denote the expected returns of entrepreneurs and investors,
then;(D; h)"(1/p)(kp!D)"k!D/p, ;(E; h)"(1!E)k, <(D; h)"D/p and
<(E; h)"Ek. Entrepreneurs are willing to participate as long as their expected





be the expected returns of debt and equity investors. In
Section 3 we will examine how these depend on the self-selection of entrepre-
neurs. The supply of funds could depend on a number of factors, including taxes,
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8The easiest way to imagine the market process is that entrepreneurs arrive serially in random
order. They accept their preferred o!er among all the o!ers still available in the market.
risk-preferences, regulatory restrictions or the cost of specialization. We do not
model this explicitly, but instead use a general speci"cation for the supply
functions. In particular, the supply of funds in a market can be any non-









The literature on "nancial market rationing has been using a price-setting
equilibrium concept. Market prices are not determined simply by the equality
of supply and demand (the &Walrasian' outcome). Instead, for a given quantity of
funds in the market, prices maximize investors' returns. And the quantity of
funds is such that the marginal investor makes zero pro"ts. Finally, individual
investors are small, so that they take the environment as given.
To use this equilibrium concept in our model, we assume the following time




to invest in a given class
of (observationally identical) entrepreneurs. They then announce prices D and
E at which those funds are available. Entrepreneurs can seek out all of these
funds, but they can accept at most one o!er.8 If they receive funds they invest in
their project. If the project succeeds, the returns will be divided according to the
debt or equity contact.
An equilibrium of this game must satisfy three conditions. First, given
the prices and quantities o!ered in the market, entrepreneurs self-select to max-
imize their expected utility. Second, given the quantities of funds committed to
the debt and equity market, investors must be o!ering prices that maximize their
expected returns. Third, given the expected return in both markets, investors are
supplying their desired quantity of funds.
Our model and equilibrium concept rests on a number of important assump-
tions. Investors are the uninformed party and they move "rst. Stiglitz and Weiss
(1990) explain that this generates screening rather than signaling behavior.
Screening equilibria are more likely to have pooling outcomes where the
market does not reveal all information in equilibrium. Entrepreneurs in this
model can apply to all contracts. This eliminates the possibility that investors
can induce self-selection through the rationing probabilities. Entrepreneur
also cannot combine debt and equity, and investors have price as their only
instrument. These assumptions were chosen so that investors cannot separate
out the entrepreneurs' types through the clever use of a menu of contracts.
We use this model speci"cation because we want to model an environment
that is complex relative to the instruments available to investors. Given the
di$culty of modeling truly complex environments, we use some simplifying
assumptions on the instruments available to investors to maintain a desired
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9The switch locus originates at the point where the MD intersect the ME. This follows from the
fact that at this point entrepreneurs are not only indi!erent between participating or not, but they
are also indi!erent between debt and equity.
balance between environmental complexity and the instruments available to
investors.
3. Self-selection of entrepreneurs
We begin by examining the self-selection process. To simplify the exposition,
we begin with the case where there exists exactly one price in each market. At the
end of the section we brie#y explain the intuition with multiple prices, relegating
the formal analysis to the appendix.
‚emma 1. Consider entrepreneurs choosing between a debt contract at D and an
equity contract at E. For a given p there exists k*(D, E) so that all types with
k’k* prefer debt and all types with k(k* prefer equity. For a given k there
exists p*(D, E) so that all types with p’p* prefer debt and all types with p(p*
prefer equity.
The intuition of Lemma 1 is that better entrepreneurs (higher expected returns)
are attracted to debt, because the entrepreneur does not need to share residual
returns. More risky entrepreneurs are attracted to debt because debt creates
convex returns for entrepreneurs.
Suppose that only debt is o!ered at some D. Fig. 1a shows that higher k and
higher p types will apply. The locus of all types that are on their reservation
expected utility } we call this the &marginal debt locus' (MD,Mh D
;(D, h)"KN) } is downward sloping. If only equity is o!ered at some E, Fig. 1b
shows that higher k types will apply, irrespective of their p. The &marginal equity
locus' (ME,Mh D;(E, h)"KN) is horizontal. If both debt and equity are o!ered
at D and E, Fig. 1c shows what types are attracted to debt and/or equity. Area
A
2
are the types that prefer equity over debt; Area A
3
are the types that prefer
debt over equity; Area A
1
are the types that would take only equity but not debt;
Area A
4
are the types that would take only debt but not equity; Area A
5
are the





the &switch locus' (SW,Mh D ;(D, h)";(E, h)5KN).9
Consider now the possibility of rationing. Denote the probability of being





a market, rationing is equally likely for any interested entrepreneur. If (1!p
E
) is
the probability for an entrepreneur in A
1
to receive equity, then it is also
the probability for an entrepreneur in A
2
to receive equity. This is because






both prefer equity over debt. Similarly, (1!p
D
) is




to receive debt. But entrepre-
neurs in A
2
would also accept debt when rationed out of the equity market. The





probability that entrepreneurs in A
3









, then they set their
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Consider next the case where there are multiple prices in one market. To
explain the main intuition, suppose that there is a unique price D in the credit








, in the equity market.




, their relative preferences over the




and 0 (for non-participation), may di!er. From
Fig. 1d we can identify nine relevant areas. Using z as a preference ordering, we









































"Mh D Dz0N, A
9
"Mh D 0 most preferredN. In other
words, a type in area A
3
, for example, would choose E
1
if available; if E
1
is not
available, it would choose D if available; if neither E
1
nor D available, it would
choose E
2
if available. The demand for funds at any one price thus depends on
the number of types that want this contract as their "rst preference, as well as the
number of types that are rationed out of their preferred contracts. From these
preference orderings, we can "nd the rationing probabilities equating supply




































































In the appendix we explain how to generalize this self-selection process to the
case with multiple prices in both markets.
4. Properties of the investors: return functions
As in the previous section, we relegate the analysis with multiple prices in
a market to the end of the section and the appendix, and focus "rst on the case
with a single price per market. The expected returns per project (or equivalently





































),:hoAh<(i; h)dN(h), i"D, E, is a function of (D, E), directly and
through A
h
. Investors get di!erent expected returns on di!erent types of entre-
preneurs. We de"ne the &average debt locus' (AD,h D <(D; h)"R
D
) and the
&average equity locus' (AE,h D <(E; h)"R
E
) as the sets of types h that yield just
average expected returns to their investors. See Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b. For all types
to the left (right) of AD, debt investors make higher (lower) than average returns.
Similar, for all types above (below) AE, equity investors make higher (lower)
than average returns.
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Fig. 2.
10Technically speaking, we are interested in the partial derivative of R
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11Analytically, the price e!ect comes from how D changes<(D, A
h
), h"2, 3, 4, in R
D
directly. The
selection e!ect comes from how D changes A
h





Consider a change in the price of debt, holding everything else constant.10
There are two e!ects. First, taking the pool constant, an increase in the price of
debt will increase investor's returns. We call this the price e+ect, which is always
positive. Second, there are changes in the pool of entrepreneurs that self-select
into debt. We will now develop a simple graphical argument to examine this
selection e+ect more closely.11
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12 If AD intersects MD in Area 4, then all types on MD to the left of AD and all types on SW are
more pro"table than average, and all types on MD to the right of AD are less pro"table than
average.





entrepreneurs on MD and below ME will leave the debt pool. And entrepre-
neurs on SW now prefer equity over debt; (1!p
E
)% of them will obtain equity
and thus also leave the debt pool. Suppose that AD intersects SW as in Fig. 2a.
For debt investors, all types on SW to the left of AD are more pro"table than
average; all types on SW to the right of AD, as well as all types on MD, are less
pro"table than average.12 This creates an ambiguous e!ect on R
D
. Losing types
that are less pro"table than average increases R
D
. This is a positive selection
e+ect. But losing types that are more pro"table than average reduces R
D
. This is
the adverse selection e+ect. If the adverse selection e+ect is su$ciently strong to
dominate both the price and the positive selection e+ect, then R
D
may be
a decreasing function of its own price D.
A similar argument holds true for the equity return function. Fig. 2b considers




constant. All entrepreneurs on ME
left of MD will leave the pool. And entrepreneurs on the SW now prefer debt
over equity; (1!p
D
)% of them will obtain debt and thus leave the pool for
equity. For equity investors, all types on SW above AE are more pro"table than
average; all types on SW below AE, as well as all types on ME are less pro"table
than average. Again, this creates an ambiguous e!ect on R
E
. Losing types that
are less pro"table than average increases R
E
: the positive selection e+ect. But
losing types that are more pro"table than average reduces R
E
: the adverse
selection e+ect. Again, if the adverse selection e+ect is su$ciently strong to
dominate both the price and the positive selection e+ect, then R
E
may be
a decreasing function of its own price E.
We summarize the main insight of this section as follows:
Result 1. If there is asymmetric information about both k and p, and if there are
two types of investors specializing in debt and equity respectively, the return
functions to debt and equity investors may be decreasing their own prices.
Result 1 should be contrasted with the results of DeMeza and Webb (1987),
which we recon"rm in the appendix. We state them as follows.
Contrast to Result 1. Suppose there are two types of investors specializing in
debt and equity, respectively. If there is asymmetric information only about k,
then returns to debt are monotonic in D and they dominate returns to equity. If
there is asymmetric information only about p, then returns to equity are
monotonic in E and they dominate returns to debt.
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13Obviously, if p
E1
"0, then there is no demand at E
2
. In the appendix we discuss how to take
account of this.
DeMeza and Webb used this argument to argue that rationing was unlikely in
this model. Result 1 suggests that their analysis depended critically on using
a single dimension of asymmetric information. A two-dimensional analysis
re-introduces the possibility of non-monotonic return functions. In the next
section we will also see that returns in one market may be smaller or larger than
returns in the other market.
The analysis with more than one price in a market is a straightforward
extension. Again, using the example of a single price in the credit market




are directly derived from their respective demand:
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The interesting thing to note is that the returns R
E1





. Intuitively, the returns to the lower price do not depend on what is
happening at the higher price, since all entrepreneurs prefer the lower over the
higher price. Furthermore, notice that R
E2
does not depend on E
1
. This is








are de"ned independent of E
2
(see Fig. 1d). The
intuition is that, while there is a demand for E
2
by entrepreneurs that are
rationed at E
1
, this set of entrepreneurs is drawn from a distribution of rationed
entrepreneurs who } since rationing is random } is the same distribution as the
one of entrepreneurs who would apply to E
2









, i.e., the returns are not a!ected by the
probability of rationing in their own market. Similar for R
E2
.13 Together, these
observations imply that R
E
is only a function of D and p
D
. In the appendix
we generalize this to say that the returns in one market only depend on the own
price and the prices and rationing probabilities in the other market, but not on
the other prices in the same market nor the rationing probabilities in the same
















The reason why these return functions may then be decreasing in their own
price is analogous to the previous argument. For any increase in the own price,
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14Note that the purpose of these calculations is not to provide a set of elegant simulations, but
only to prove the theoretical existence of equilibria with credit and/or equity rationing. Alternatively
one may also view the sparse speci"cation as a strength: using only these two rays we are able to
generate the full variety of credit and/or equity rationing equilibria.
there will be a positive price e!ect, a positive selection e!ect, and an adverse
selection e!ect; the net e!ect may go either way.
5. Equilibrium rationing
As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the result that the investors' return functions
may be decreasing in their own prices is at the heart of rationing. Stiglitz and
Weiss emphasized that there is a possibility of rationing, but that its occurrence
depends on parameters. In particular, rationing depends on the distribution of
types (which a!ects the shape of the investor's return function) and the quantity
of fund supplied (which determines the position on the investor's return
function).
Ideally, one would like to have a general characterization of how these model
parameters translate into the existence of rationing equilibria. This turns out to
be analytically not tractable. But in order to establish the more modest claim
that it is possible that there is credit and/or equity rationing in equilibrium, we
only need to provide examples. In the appendix we develop a series of fully
parameterized, numerical examples to show the existence of the various types of
rationing equilibria. To simplify our calculations, we use a sparse density
function that has a piecewise linear positive density along one vertical and one
horizontal ray, and is zero everywhere else (see Fig. 3a).14 In the appendix we
discuss the details of the numerical examples.
To convey how we construct a rationing equilibrium, consider the case of
rationing in the equity market with market clearing in the debt market. First
we choose some D* as the price in the debt market and we set p
D
"0. In the
example of the appendix this corresponds to D*"20. Using an appropriate
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. Let m be the fraction of funds allocated to E*
1
, and let p
E
be
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15The market must clear at the higher price, or else there exists a feasible deviation of o!ering
a price higher than E*
2
that entrepreneurs who are rationed at E*
2
would accept. The rationing at the
lower price persists because there does not exist another price that would yield a higher return to
investors and would be accepted by some entrepreneurs. See also Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
the rationing probability at E*
1
. The equity market is in equilibrium where there
is excess demand at E*
1
but market clearing at E*
2
.15 The equilibrium condition
















. There is rationing
at the low price E*
1
, but all entrepreneurs that are rationed at the low price E*
1
,
yet willing to accept the higher price E*
2
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Fig. 4.
entrepreneurs) all receive funding. In the example of the appendix we have
p
E
"0.1, since (1!0.1) 29#0.1 12.5"27.35. To "nish the construction of the

















) is non-decreasing at D*, and
















(D) is depicted in Fig. 4a.
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16This is not necessarily the case with credit rationing, as it is straightforward to construct
examples with two-price rationing equilibria in the credit market
In the appendix we use this logic to construct other rationing equilibria.
Using di!erent parameter values for the density function, we construct an
equilibrium with rationing only in the credit market. An interesting di!erence to
the above construction is that the return function has a global interior max-
imum (see Fig. 4a). This implies that there is only a single price in the market
where rationing occurs.16 Finally, we also construct an equilibrium with
rationing in both the credit and the equity market. From these constructions we
can state the main result.
Result 2. If there is asymmetric information about both k and p, and if there are
two types of investors specializing in debt and equity respectively, then it is
possible that there is credit rationing, equity rationing or both.
Our examples establish the possibility of the various types of rationing
equilibria. This is in line with the previous literature that always emphasized
that adverse selection may cause rationing. There typically exist some parameter
ranges where the adverse selection e!ect is not particularly powerful and as
a result no rationing occur. But for other parameter ranges the adverse selection
e!ect is su$ciently strong to generate rationing. Our result establishes the
equivalent result in the more general setting where there are two markets, credit
and equity, and where investors are faced with two-dimensional asymmetric
information.
A natural question in our model is whether there can be multiple equilibria.
Indeed, the model can generate multiple equilibria, and multiplicity of equilibria
is intimately linked to the shape of the supply functions. In the appendix we
generate some supply functions such that, in the example of credit and equity
rationing, there exists a second equilibrium that contains more rationing in the
equity market and less rationing in the credit market. We can also "nd some
supply functions such that the second equilibrium has market clearing in both
markets. On the other hand, we also show that it is easy to identify conditions
that allow us to rule out the existence of a second equilibrium with both markets
clearing. The general point is that, while there may be multiple equilibria in
this model, some and possibly all equilibria may feature rationing.
It is also worth mentioning the meaning of rationing in these equilibria. In
a two-price equilibrium, those entrepreneurs who are willing to accept the
higher price are rationed in the sense that they cannot obtain funds at the same
price as other observationally identical entrepreneurs. Those entrepreneurs who
are not willing to accept the higher price fail to receive funding in this market.
Some of them may seek funding in the other market. If there is rationing in the
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17For example, when there is equity rationing and credit markets clear, it is easy to see from
Fig. 3b (interpreting the ME line as pertaining to the lower price) that some of the entrepreneurs
who are rationed in the equity market (namely those slightly above k"20) are also not willing to
accept debt. They will thus remain without funding.
18For example, with equity rationing but credit market clearing there is a high density around the
point k"15 and p"4, where the MD intersects the horizontal density ray. This means that
investors in the credit market get a strong positive selection e!ect if they raise their prices, as they
will loose a signi"cant number of high-risk, low-return entrepreneurs. This implies that the debt
return function is upward sloping and no rationing occurs in the debt market.
other market too, they may fail to obtain any funding. Even if there is no
rationing some of them may not "nd any acceptable o!er in the other market,
and again they are left without funding.17 The point is that while an outside
observer may look at this environment and argue that there are many oppor-
tunities for the entrepreneur to obtain funding, it may well be that the funding
that is still available comes at unacceptable terms, and the funding that has
acceptable terms is rationed.
Our construction of examples also conveys a strong intuition about the
causes of rationing. In general, adverse selection causes rationing when a
price increase leads a disproportionately larger number of good types to exit
the market. In this model, many of best types are also choosing between debt
and equity, and their switching behavior may cause rationing. Intuitively,
rationing thus occurs when there are enough good "rms switching between these
two markets.
To illustrate this further, consider Fig. 3b. In order to create rationing, all our
examples allocate a high density around the SW point (at k"40 and p"1), i.e.,
around the point where entrepreneurs switch between the debt and the equity
market. This switching behavior causes adverse selection, which induces inves-
tors not to raise their prices. In the example with simultaneous credit and equity
rationing this adverse selection is strong for both the debt and the equity
market. For the construction of the examples with rationing in only one market,
the adverse selection e!ect is strong only in one market (the one that features
rationing), but there is some counter-balancing positive selection e!ect in the
other market.18
The fact that the density around the switch locus SW is a key driver in all
these rationing equilibria suggests that competition between the debt and the
equity market may cause rationing. To make this point more precise, consider
the following result, which we prove in the appendix:
Contrast to Result 2. If there is asymmetric information about both k and p, and
if all investors specialize only in equity, there cannot be any rationing. If they
specialize only in debt, however, there may still be rationing.
The intuition for the "rst part of the result is that if only equity is o!ered in the
market, then there are no adverse selection e!ects. This can be seen from the fact
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19 In Hellmann and Stiglitz (1995) we discuss several other extensions of the model and we also
derive some additional welfare results.
that in this case the only selection e!ects occur along ME, which always lies
below AE. The second part is due to Hillier and Ibrahimo (1992), and it is
straightforward to construct examples that con"rm their result.
This result shows that heterogeneity among investors matters. If investors
were all o!ering equity then the market would always clear. But in such a world,
investors specializing in debt would see a pro"table opportunity to attract some
of the best (high-k and low-p) entrepreneurs away from the equity market. This
creates competition between investors in the debt and equity market. If there are
many good entrepreneurs who are likely to switch between the two markets,
competition to attract them may induce investors in one or both markets to
o!er prices that are below the Walrasian level, and rationing ensues. Note,
however, that if the credit market is our benchmark, competition between the
two markets may also reduce rationing. Indeed, we constructed an example
where there is credit rationing in the absence of an equity market, but both
markets clear after the introduction of an equity market.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we ask whether previously disparate theories of credit and equity
rationing can be made compatible. We consider a setting where investors special-
ize either in debt or equity "nancing, and compete for a common set of entrepre-
neurs. There is asymmetric information about both the expected returns and the
risk of the entrepreneur's projects. We show that there may be credit and/or
equity rationing. Moreover, competition between markets may cause rationing.19
This paper makes some strong simplifying assumptions. Investors can only
o!er simple debt and equity contracts, but any combinations of the two, or other
more general contracts; and entrepreneurs have no means of signalling their
types. We make these assumptions in order to capture an environment that is
characterized by a large amount asymmetric information relative to the instru-
ments available to sort out that information. In future research it would
be interesting to introduce a wider variety of contracts, especially if one can
model them in an environment that is still characterized by a large amount of
asymmetric information.
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Appendix
Proof of ‚emma 1. Take (D, E) as given. We have ;(D; h)!;(E; h)"
k!D/p!(1!E)k"Ek!D/p. This is an increasing function of k and p.
Self-selection and rationing probabilities with multiple prices in one market: the
extension to the case of multiple prices in one market involves additional
notation. Let +D,MD
j
N, j"1,2, JD, and +E,MEjN, j"1,2, JE, be the of-








N the associated quantities of
funds. For every h, we can establish a preference ordering over all elements of
M+D, +EN and the option not to invest, denoted by 0. All entrepreneurs will
prefer lower prices to higher prices in any one market. Di!erent orderings arise
because di!erent types may have di!erent rankings for the di!erent prices across
markets and the option not to invest. We can identify H di!erent groups of types
that we call A
h
, h"1,2,H, so that all types within a set Ah have the same
preference ordering over the elements of M+D, +E, 0N. For every h and D
j
there
then exist a distinct subset of M+D, +EN that is the set of prices that all types in
h prefer over D
j









follows: If all types in A
h
prefer not to invest over accepting D
j





"0; but if all types in A
h
prefer to accept D
j















) is the probability for an entre-
preneur in A
h
to accept the o!er D
j
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21 In fact, R
Dj
does not depend on +p
D
either: If entrepreneurs accept a contract D
j
, they must have
been rejected at all cheaper debt prices. R
Dj







numerator and denominator. These terms cancel out, i.e., R
Dj
is independent of them. Similarly for
P
Dj








, the rationing probabilities
p
Dl
are also irrelevant to D
j
. It follows that R
Dj








Investor return functions with multiple prices in one market: The investors'








































We can identify some irrelevant arguments in the return functions. Consider
the set of all types that are willing to accept D
j
. Suppose now that a lower
price D
k
is o!ered in the debt market. All types that are willing to invest
at D
j
are also willing to invest at D
k
. Suppose that there is some positive
rationing probability at this lower price, i.e., p
Dk
’0. Since not all entrepreneurs
can obtain funds at the lower price, there is still demand for D
j
. The set of
types that are now willing to accept D
j
is reduced by a factor (1!p
Dk
). But
since rationing a!ects all entrepreneurs equally, it contains the same composi-
tion of entrepreneurs. The return per entrepreneur R
Dj
is thus not a!ected
















P0. This de"nition allows us to conclude that R
Dj
is not a!ected by
any lower debt prices. In "nding the equilibrium we will obviously use the
fact that if there is no rationing at a lower price there is no demand at the
higher price.
Consider now a price D
l
that is higher than D
j





, the selection of types accepting D
j
is not a!ected. It follows
that R
Dj
is independent of all higher prices for debt. We have thus shown
that, holding all p's and Q's constant, the R
Dj
function does not depend on any































) to evaluate the returns to
individual debt investors o!ering a price di!erent from a proposed equilibrium
price.
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22All that matters for the equilibria is that the return functions are decreasing in their own price
over some range (see Section 3). Note also that the continuity properties of the model directly imply
that any smooth approximation to our density function would yield the same equilibrium within an
e-approximation. Such smooth approximations would also not have to be restricted to density
functions that have positive density only along two line segments.
Proof of the contrast to Result 1. If k is the only parameter of asymmetric
information, then R
D
"D/p, which is independent of k. R
D
is monotonic in
D since there is only the positive price e!ect and there are no selection e!ects.
Suppose now that for (D, E) both debt and equity investors attract a positive
mass of entrepreneurs and let k
SW
be the switch point. For all k(k
SW
we have
;(E, k)"(1!E)k’k!D/p";(D, k). This implies Ek(D/p, but<(E, k)"
Ek and <(D, k)"D/p, so that <(E, k)(<(D, k) for all types that prefer equity.





If p is the only parameter of asymmetric information, then R
E
"Ek, which is
independent of p. R
E
is monotonic in E. Suppose now that for (D, E) both debt
and equity investors attract a positive mass of entrepreneurs and let p
SW
be there
switch point. For all p’p
SW
we have;(E, k)"(1!E)k(k!D/p";(D, k),






Discussion of numerical examples. We will now explain how we constructed
the main numerical examples. A full description of all the variations of these
examples, as well as the Mathematica programs used in the calculations are
available from the authors upon request.
We choose a sparse density function: n(k, p) is zero everywhere, except for two
line segments. The "rst line segment is vertical at p"1 and extends from k"15
to k"100; the second line segment is horizontal at k"15 and extends from
p"1 to p"10. The points Mk"m
j

































"10 subdivide the horizontal line into four





as shown in Fig. 3a. For all examples we assume that the
entrepreneur's opportunity costs are given by K"10.
We choose this simple density function because it considerably simpli"es
the numerical calculations. The piecewise constant density function creates
kinked return functions, but our results do not depend on this kink.22
Again, the purpose of these calculations is not to provide an elegant
simulation, but merely to establish the theoretical possibility of rationing
equilibria.
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23Suppose E
1
"50% was the only price and there was rationing. In this case an equity investor
would "nd it pro"table to o!er equity at a higher price. From Fig. 4d we see that a price E"58%,
for example, would yield higher pro"ts. And because there is rationing at the lower price, some
entrepreneurs will accept the higher price.
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maximum at D"20. This creates the possibility for credit rationing. At D"20
and E"50% returns to debt are R
D
"16.46 and the demand for funds is
N
D
"126. If we want to construct an equilibrium with 10% rationing, we can





debt investors want to o!er only 113.4 units of fund,there is excess demand for
funds. Entrepreneurs have a 10% probability of not receiving any debt.
From Fig. 4a we immediately see that debt investor would not want to o!er
a higher price than D"20. We also need to verify that equity investors indeed














"16.75)"30 closes the equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the rationing result does not depend on one market





. By changing the density n
11
, for example, we can
make the returns to debt equal or higher than the returns to equity. At
n
11











. In all these cases the rationing outcome is maintained. An
equivalent observation can also be made for all the other examples below.
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has a local maximum at E
1
"50%, but
this is not a global maximum. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) "rst showed that in such
circumstances the equilibrium entails two prices.23 To construct the two-price
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equilibrium, suppose that 26.10 units of funds are being o!ered at E
1
"50%.




"50%)"29.00, there is a 10% probability of rationing.
















"56.42%)"12.50. But since only rationed entrepreneurs will accept the
higher price, only 10% of 12.50, or 1.25 is the e!ective demand. With any supply




"16.47)"26.10#1.25"27.35, investors can al-
locate 26.10 to E
1
"50% and 1.25 to E
2





. Now there is no rationing at E
2
"56.42% so that no
investor can o!er a higher price. But from Fig. 4d all other prices yield a lower




"56.42% are equilibrium prices.
Again, we also need to verify that debt investors indeed want to o!er D"20.













"752.36, so that any




"16.54)"752.36 closes the equilibrium.
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(E), taking the equilibrium























"52.89%)"87.743. Suppose the supply of funds at D
1
is 0.91]
32.593"119.334 and at E
1
it is 0.9]113.462"102.116, then there is a 10%
rationing probability in both markets. If the supply of funds at D
2
is 0.1]
105.067"10.507 and at E
2
it is 0.1]87.743"8.774, then there is no rationing at











Discussion of multiple equilibria, using the example of credit and equity
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We can use yet another set of supply functions to generate a second equilib-













(E)"80.451. We can therefore



















To generate these multiple equilibria, we impose speci"c restrictions on
the supply functions. We can also take the opposite approach and look for
restrictions on the supply function that eliminates certain kinds of equilibria.
In particular, we may be interested in "nding restrictions, such that there
does not exist any equilibrium with both markets clearing. To do this in our
example, suppose that apart from the rationing equilibrium (denoted by *)





























(D@, E@). By assuming a su$ciently elastic supply of fund we
can eliminate all equilibria with a di!erent return than R*
D
. Similar for R*
E
.









"15.915. For this we generate the





















)"110.890. These are given by D"20.024
and E"0.5060. Straightforward inspection reveals then that at these prices
both return function are strictly decreasing in their own prices. This implies that
for these parameter values there cannot exist another equilibrium without
rationing.
Intuition for the rationing outcome in the numerical examples. Consider
Fig. 3b. In all our examples D"20 and E"50% are the (lowest) equilibrium
prices in the two markets. ME is given by the point Mk"20, p"1N, MD is
given by the points Mk"30, p"1N and Mk"15, p"4N and SW is given
by the point Mk"40, p"1N. The key intuition in the credit rationing
example is that the high density n
2
implies that raising the price above D"20 is
not pro"table for debt investors since a large portion of pro"table entrepreneurs
would switch to the equity market. The high density at n
6
insures that the equity
return function does not have a local maximum at E"50%. In the equity







entrepreneurs that accept equity are located) implies that equity investors do not
want to raise their prices above 50% so as not to lose the relatively pro"table
entrepreneurs around SW. Returns to debt remain monotone at D"20 since
the density n
4






. In the credit and equity




have a high density, implying that
neither debt nor equity investors have an incentive to raise their prices. The




ensure that investors do not want to lower their
prices either.
T. Hellmann, J. Stiglitz / European Economic Review 44 (2000) 281}304 303
Proof of the contrast to Result 2. If there is no debt market, then the returns to
equity are given by R
E
"E:=k0k dN(k)/:=k0dN(k) where k0"K/(1!E). This is
an increasing function of E. There is no adverse selection e!ect in this case and
thus there cannot be any rationing.
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